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Abstract 
 
 Immigration policies often differ spatially between countries and temporally in a 
country. Therefore, it is always interesting to look at the determinants of an immigration policy. 
In the wake of Rohingya refugee crisis in 2016, Indonesia and Malaysia altered their 
immigration policies. Indonesia established a Presidential Decree on Handling Refugees from 
Abroad which does not address refugee's work rights, while Malaysia allowed 300 Rohingya 
refugees to work in the country despite lacking a legal framework for refugees. The research 
question is, why Indonesia and Malaysia made contrasting policies on refugee’s employment 
in 2016 regardless of their common characteristics as transit points for refugees? Using 
theories on immigration policy-making and process-tracing method, this paper found that both 
countries’ economic conditions, cultural affinities, security perceptions, as well as external 
relations influence their immigration policy-making process. Nevertheless, the strongest 
determinants of their contrasting policies on refugee's employment in 2016 are employment 
and poverty rates, the composition of skilled and unskilled migrants relative to native workers, 
as well as external relation with the sending countries. 
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I. Introduction 
More than 65.6 million people are displaced globally and around 22.5 million of them 
are considered as refugees (UNHCR, 2017). The term refugees refer to a group of people who 
leave their country to avoid conflict or persecution and could not or unwilling to return. The 
bases of their persecution vary from political action and belief to merely race and ethnicity 
(Arendt, 1973). When the refugees arrive at a country’s border, they suddenly become the 
problem of that country (Jacobsen, 1996). The ‘receiving country’ should carefully choose their 
response toward the refugees since it will affect their own nationals and their external relations 
with other countries. This choice of treatments by the receiving country is what we called an 
immigration policy. 
 Immigration policies might differ spatially between countries and temporally in a 
country. Therefore, it is always interesting to look at the determinants of an immigration policy. 
In the wake of Rohingya refugee crisis, Indonesia and Malaysia altered their immigration 
policies in 2016. Indonesia established a Presidential Decree on Handling Refugees from 
Abroad which does not address refugee's work rights, while Malaysia allowed 300 Rohingya 
refugees to work in the country despite lacking a legal framework for refugees (Yi, 2016; 
Varagur, 2017). It is intriguing to see how the two countries reached for diverging policies on 
refugee’s employment, even though they shared similar characteristics of transit countries. 
Thus, the research question that will be explored in this paper is: Why Indonesia and 
Malaysia made contrasting policies on refugee’s employment in 2016 regardless of their 
common characteristics as transit points for refugees? 
 In the second section, this paper will present theories on immigration policy-making and draw 
preliminary hypotheses. The third section will provide justification for case, method and data 
selection. In the fourth section, this paper will analyze the preliminary hypotheses with a 
process-tracing method. Finally, at the fifth section, this paper will summarize the findings and 
present suggestion for future policy and research. I argue that both countries’ economic 
conditions, cultural affinities, security perceptions and external relations play a significant role 
in their immigration policy-making process. However, the strongest determinants of their 
contrasting policies on refugee's employment in 2016 are employment and poverty rates, the 
composition of skilled and unskilled migrants relative to native workers, as well as external 
relation with the sending countries. 
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II. Theory 
Immigration policy represents the attitude of the host country toward immigrants. This 
policy determines what kind of individuals that are allowed to enter its territory, as well as what 
kind of rights that will be entailed to them while they are staying in the country (Sales, 2007). 
Immigration policies may vary spatially between countries as well as temporally in a country. 
Hence, this section will examine theories on immigration policy-making to find the 
determinants of a country’s policy toward refugee’s employment. 
 Some scholars argue that immigration policies are determined by economic conditions 
in receiving countries. Jacobsen (1996) stated that the conditions include land availability, 
infrastructures, and employment systems. According to her, refugee inflow puts burdens on the 
above-mentioned factors and thus agitates local population (Jacobsen, 1996). Other scholars 
focus more on the characteristics of host country’s labor market. Cassarino and Fargues (2006) 
noted that low capacity to absorb extra labors will lead to high unemployment and poverty rates 
which subsequently deter the government from promoting economic integration. Facchini and 
Mayda (2008) added that the composition of skilled and unskilled migrants relative to native 
workers matters since integrating unskilled migrants into the labor market might threaten 
unskilled native workers but assist skilled native workers and vice versa. Other scholars oppose 
the significance of unemployment rate and skilled/unskilled migrants’ composition to 
immigration policy-making, especially when the country experiences economic growth 
(Hatton, 2004; Haas & Natter, 2015; Jamil, Fakhoury, Yamin, Arnetz, & Arnetz, 2016). They 
suggest that the growth in GDP and GDP per capita are stronger determinants of an 
immigration policy because they ease fiscal pressure and made the labor market more buoyant 
(Hatton, 2004). I argue that notions on land availability and infrastructures are more suitable 
for analyzing other kinds of immigration policy like the entry policy but when we talk about 
employment policy, it is more suitable to use notions on labor market characteristic and GDP 
growth. Therefore, my hypotheses on the effect of host country’s economic conditions on its 
immigration policies are: 
• H1: In cases of stable GDP and GDP per capita’s growth in receiving countries, this 
paper expects more permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
• H2: In cases of low unemployment and poverty rates in receiving countries, this paper 
expects more permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
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• H3: In cases of a favorable composition of skilled and unskilled refugees relative to 
native workers, this paper expects more permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
Other scholars argue that immigration policies are influenced by immigrants’ cultural 
identity which includes race, ethnicity, and religion (Rosenblum & Cornelius, 2012). Countries 
often accept migrants who have similar ancestry with their own population (Joppke, 2005). 
Besides, social and legal treatments received by immigrants may vary based on their cultural 
affinity with the local population (Cassarino & Fargues, 2006). Receiving country cares about 
immigrants' cultural identity because it wants to avoid ethnic conflict and minimize the impact 
of migration (Joppke, 2005; Rosenblum & Cornelius, 2012). Some of the liberal countries also 
impose ethnic-based policy as a form of ‘positive discrimination’ or solidarity to protect 
immigrants (Joppke, 2005). However, Jacobsen (1996) noted that the responses given by 
similar ‘ethnically defined' communities could vary at times. She gave an example of how 
several Pashtun tribes in Pakistan accepted Pashtun refugees from Afghanistan whilst other 
Pashtun tribes denied them (Jacobsen, 1996). I argue that the notions of cultural affinity and 
solidarity are relevant to our discussion on refugee’s employment since some countries only 
allow particular groups of refugee to work legally. Thus, my hypotheses on the effect of cultural 
affinity on host countries’ immigration policies are: 
• H4: In cases of strong cultural affinity between the local population and the refugees, 
this paper expects more permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
• H5: In cases of strong cultural solidarity between the local population and the 
refugees, this paper expects more permissive policies on refugee's employment. 
Some authors argue that immigration policies are determined by perceptions of security 
in receiving countries. Notion of national security includes military conflict, internal disorder 
and resource scarcity (Jacobsen, 1996). Jacobsen stated that refugees commonly create real or 
‘perceived’ threats to host countries, namely their involvement in criminal activities and 
relationship with militant groups (Jacobsen, 1996). Totten (2008) confirmed the significance 
of security perceptions to immigration policy-making. He noted that negative security 
perceptions on refugees, for example as a potential pool for terrorist group, will trigger anti-
immigration policies (Totten, 2008). In contrast, positive security perceptions on refugees, like 
as sources of manpower, will encourage pro-immigration policies (Totten, 2008). Nevertheless, 
I argue that Totten’s points are more suitable to examine host country’s entry policy while our 
discussion focuses on refugee’s employment policy. Several authors suggest that permissive 
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employment policies might prevent security problems. Refugee’s employment could prevent 
human trafficking and labor exploitation as it allows better management of the group through 
biometric data collection (Towle, 2016). It also reduces social tensions between refugees and 
local population as the former become more self-sufficient (Towle, 2016). Last but not least, 
recognizing basic rights of refugees such as work rights will improve their mental health, and 
thus hinder the development of radical beliefs from militant groups (Ying, 2017). Accordingly, 
it is more applicable to see security threats as the catalyst of permissive policies on refugee’s 
employment. My hypothesis on the effect of host country’s security perception on its 
immigration policy is: 
• H6: In cases of negative security perceptions toward refugees by the host country, this 
paper expects more permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
 Whilst the aforementioned theories fixate on domestic determinants, other scholars 
argue that immigration policies are determined by host country’s external relations with 
sending countries, international organizations and destination countries (Freeman, 1994; 
Jacobsen, 1996; Cassarino & Fargues, 2006; Sales, 2007). Host country needs extensive 
engagement with sending countries, particularly their police and immigration authorities to 
manage migration flow (Sales, 2007). When dealing with refugees, host country might opt for 
policies that embarrass or support a sending country (Jacobsen, 1996). This is because granting 
asylum seeker a refugee status is equal to acknowledging the persecution made by the sending 
country (Jacobsen, 1996). International refugee regime like UNHCR limits the flexibility of 
host country’s immigration policies through the enforcement of international norms, 
international assistance and international publicity (Freeman, 1994; Jacobsen, 1996). Cassarino 
and Fargues (2006) expanded this theory by adding regional trading blocs into the equation. 
They argued that regional trade generates mutual commitments that subsequently engender 
pro-immigration policies (Cassarino & Fargues, 2006). Furthermore, they added destination 
countries into consideration as their research was on transit migration. They noted that host 
countries might issue pro-immigration policies if they have particular interests concerning the 
adjacent destination countries (Cassarino & Fargues, 2006). I argue that Cassarino and 
Fargues’s points on regional trading blocs and destination countries are more suitable to 
analyze regular migration. Regional trade only prompts legal migration and irregular migrants 
like refugees barely have the privilege to choose their destination countries. Therefore, my 
hypotheses on the effect of external relations to host country’s immigration policies are: 
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• H7: In cases of unfriendly relations between host countries and the sending countries, 
this paper expects more permissive policies on refugee’s employment.  
• H8: In cases of strong involvement of the international refugee regime in host 
countries, this paper expects more permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
 
III. Methodology 
This paper applies process-tracing method to find causal mechanisms between the 
aforementioned hypotheses and the policy-outcomes in Indonesia and Malaysia. The process-
tracing method is chosen because it helps to provide strong causal-inferences by distinguishing 
causal relations from ‘spurious correlations' (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). 
 I choose Indonesia and Malaysia as the case studies to explain how transit countries 
make policies for refugees. Both countries are transit points for migrants traveling from Middle 
East, Africa and Asia to Australia (Hugo, Tan, & Napitupulu, 2014). I argue that even though 
Malaysia to some degree is a destination country for migrant workers, it remains a transit 
country for refugees. This is because Malaysia and Indonesia have not signed the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and thus not obliged to integrate the refugees (UNHCR, 2015). Besides, the 
population in Indonesia and Malaysia also are predominantly Muslims which are deemed 
suitable for Muslim refugees like the Rohingya (CIA, n.d.). Finally, before 2016, both countries 
were very reluctant to give the refugees legal work permit (Fox News, 2015). Therefore, it is 
fascinating how the two countries reached for diverging policies on refugee’s employment in 
2016. I believe that studying Indonesia and Malaysia will give us a better understanding on 
transit countries’ immigration policies in general. 
 Having said that, naturally, there are differences between Indonesia and Malaysia that 
might create bias in the comparison if not addressed carefully. One prominent example is that 
Malaysia hosts 10 times more refugees and asylum seekers than Indonesia (UNHCR, 2016). 
But if we look closely, the imbalanced number of refugees in both countries are engendered by 
the Rohingyas and other Myanmar’s refugees (UNHCR, 2015). This may explain why 
Malaysia only allow Rohingya refugees to work in the country. Thus, this paper will consider 
the differences between both countries not as liabilities but as possibilities to answer the 
research question. 
6 
 
 Data used in this paper are derived from literary research on primary and secondary 
sources. Data on number and composition of the refugees in both countries are captured from 
the UNHCR database. UNHCR provides timely and credible information about the ‘population 
of concern’ in Indonesia and Malaysia, distinguished by their status and country of origin. 
Using these data, we could analyze the causal mechanism between ‘ethnic migration’ and both 
countries’ immigration policy. This paper also looked at both country’s facts and figures 
provided by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), especially on economy and demography. 
These data are used to examine causal mechanisms between economic capacity and 
immigration policy. CIA data are used for both countries in order to avoid bias in figures from 
different sources. Next, this paper looked at Governments’ statements in media (for examples: 
Kuronumo, 2017; Putri, 2017) to observe their security perception on refugees, because as the 
policy-makers, Governments' perception is strong determinants of immigration policies. 
Finally, I also study documents published by international organizations and news on media 
(for examples: Bali Process, 2016; The Guardian, 2016) to analyze the causal mechanisms 
between external relations and immigration policies. 
 
IV. Analysis 
1. Economic Condition 
Economic condition is one of the potential determinants of immigration policies. The 
condition includes the growth of GDP and GDP per capita, the unemployment and poverty 
rates, as well as the composition of skilled and unskilled migrants relative to native workers 
(Hatton, 2004; Cassarino & Fargues, 2006; Facchini & Mayda, 2008). This paper will now 
examine the correlation between economic conditions in Indonesia and Malaysia and their 
immigration policies. 
H1: In cases of stable GDP and GDP per capita’s growth in receiving countries, this paper 
expects more permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
 With a GDP (PPP) over $3 trillion in 2017, Indonesia is known as the largest economy 
in Southeast Asia. The country also enjoyed a stable growth in its GDP, namely 5% in 2016 
and 5.2% in 2017 (CIA, n.d.). The GDP per capita of Indonesia was around $12,400 in 2017 
since the country has more than 260 million people. Still, the number increased from $11,900 
in 2016 and $11,500 in 2015 (CIA, n.d.). Comparatively, Malaysia is the third largest economy 
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in Southeast Asia with a GDP (PPP) over $900 billion in 2017 (CIA, n.d.). Similar to Indonesia, 
Malaysia also experienced a stable growth in GDP, particularly 4.2% in 2016 and 5.4% in 2017 
(CIA, n.d.). As Malaysia has about 31 million people, its GDP per capita was around $28,900 
in 2017 which increased from $27,800 in 2016 and 27,000 in 2015 (CIA, n.d.). 
 As can be seen, both countries experienced stable GDP and GDP per capita growth 
from 2015 to 2017. The hypothesis suggests that GDP and GDP per capita growth will trigger 
permissive immigration policies, so we expect both Indonesia and Malaysia to be more open 
to refugee's employment. However, only Malaysia that seems to fit the hypothesis. The 
question is, why Indonesia does not issue a temporary work permit for refugees despite 
enjoying stable GDP and GDP per capita growth? 
Hatton (2004) stated that a growth in GDP and GDP per capita induces permissive 
immigration policy as it eases fiscal pressure and makes the labor market more buoyant. 
Hatton’s notion is under the assumption that GDP and GDP per capita growth raise wages and 
create job vacancies. While it is true that the minimum monthly wages in Indonesia have been 
increasing over the past few years, the monthly wages for unskilled workers have been 
decreasing. This phenomenon indicates low demand for unskilled workers, that is in line with 
some research which suggests that the demand for unskilled workers in Indonesia has been 
outpaced by the demand for skilled workers (Allen, 2016). As Indonesia has a surplus of 
unskilled workers, I argue that the growth in GDP and GDP per capita does not make its labor 
market more buoyant. This notion will be further elaborated in the discussion about 
unemployment and poverty rates, as well as the composition of skilled and unskilled labors. 
H2: In cases of low unemployment and poverty rates in receiving countries, this paper expects 
more permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
 In 2017, Indonesia had more than 126 million labor force (CIA, n.d.). From the total 
labor force, 5.4% or about 6.8 million people were unemployed in 2017 (CIA, n.d.). The 
country also had 10.9% or around 28.3 million people living below the poverty line in 2016 
(CIA, n.d.). On the other hand, Malaysia had less than 15 million labor force in 2017 (CIA, 
n.d.). The unemployment rate in Malaysia is 3.4% in 2017 or about 500,000 people. 
Furthermore, Malaysia had 3.8% or around 1 million people living below the poverty line in 
2009 (CIA, n.d.). The latest report shows that the poverty rate in Malaysia falls to 0.4% or only 
120,000 people in 2014 (World Bank, n.d.). 
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 As has been noted, there are 13 times more people who were unemployed and 236 times 
more people who lived below the poverty line in Indonesia than Malaysia. High unemployment 
and poverty rates indicate low migrants’ absorption capacity as they engender social tensions 
between immigrants and native population (Jacobsen, 1996; Cassarino & Fargues, 2006). A 
local survey shows that Indonesian people, especially those with low income are very reluctant 
to accept foreign workers as they are afraid that the foreigners will take job opportunities from 
local population (Hamdani, 2016). Accordingly, this paper expects Malaysia to have a more 
permissive policy on refugee's employment than Indonesia. This hypothesis is satisfied. 
H3: In cases of a favorable composition of skilled and unskilled refugees relative to native 
workers, this paper expects more permissive policies on refugee's employment. 
Malaysia allows 300 Rohingya refugees to work in its plantation and manufacturing 
sectors. I argue that Rohingya refugees can be categorized as unskilled migrants, given that 
they had limited access to employment and education in their country of origin (Lewa, 2009). 
Correspondingly, Malaysia has a shortage of manpower in labor-intensive industries as young 
native workers often avoid 3D jobs (dirty, dangerous and difficult) like farming and 
manufacturing (Minter, 2016). As a result, the country relies on foreign workers to fill the 3D 
jobs. There were 2.1 million legal foreign workers in Malaysia or around 14% of its total labor 
force in 2016 (Minter, 2016). Almost half (44%) of the legal foreign workers work at 3D jobs, 
not to mention over 1 million illegal workers (Minter, 2016). On the contrary, Statistics 
Indonesia (BPS) noted that 66% of Indonesia’s labor force is unskilled workers (Bernie, 2018). 
Current economic modernization in Indonesia has fueled demand for skilled workers and halted 
demand for unskilled workers which subsequently create a surplus of unskilled labors (Allen, 
2016). Consequently, Indonesia does not rely on foreign workers to fill its labor-intensive 
industries. There were only 74,000 foreign workers in Indonesia or about 0.06% of its total 
labor force in (Ador, 2017) 2017. The foreign workers are often skilled workers with unique 
proficiency (Indonesia Investments, 2016). 
From the discussion above we found that Malaysia has a shortage of unskilled workers 
while Indonesia has a surplus of them. Facchini and Mayda (2008) stated that the composition 
of skilled and unskilled migrants relative to native workers influence immigration policies as 
integrating unskilled migrants into the labor market might threaten unskilled native workers 
but assist skilled native workers. Considering that Rohingya refugees are mainly unskilled 
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migrants, this paper expects Malaysia to have a more permissive policy on the refugees’ 
employment than Indonesia. In this case, the hypothesis is satisfied. 
This phenomenon could also be explained through the perspective of interest group 
politics (Freeman G. P., 1995). Malaysia has a long history of foreign workers reliance which 
began in the early 1970s when the country had undergone economic growth and 
industrialization (Kanapathy, 2006). Nowadays, legal foreign workers contribute to over 10% 
of Malaysia’s economy, not to mention the illegal foreign workers (Malaysian Digest, 2015). 
A recent shortage in plantation and construction sectors have cost Malaysia an annual loss of 
RM 1 billion (Povera, 2018). After Malaysian government froze the plan to hire additional 
foreign workers in 2016, several labor-intensive industries, such as plantation, construction, 
manufacturing, and furniture-making industries lobbied the government to continue the 
previous plan (Wai, 2016). The cabinet eventually followed their lobby and lifted the ban on 
hiring additional foreign workers (Wai, 2016). According to Freeman (1995), ‘organized 
opinion' of interest groups like business leaders are important for politician and government's 
officials to maximize their votes in national elections. Correspondingly, Malaysia had a general 
election in May 2018 (BBC, 2018). 
2. Cultural Affinity and Solidarity 
Other potential determinants of immigration policies are cultural affinity and solidarity 
between the local population and the refugees. Host countries often more lenient to migrants 
who share ethnic/cultural traits with its local population in order to avoid ethnic conflict and 
minimize the impact of migration (Joppke, 2005; Rosenblum & Cornelius, 2012). Some 
countries also impose ethnic-based policy as a form of ‘positive discrimination’ or solidarity 
toward immigrants (Joppke, 2005). I argue that the notions of cultural affinity and solidarity 
are relevant to our discussion as Malaysia only allow Rohingya refugees to work in the country. 
This paper will now examine the correlation between the ethnic identity of the refugees and 
immigration policies in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
H4: In cases of strong cultural affinity between the local population and the refugees, this 
paper expects more permissive policies on refugee's employment. 
Malaysia hosts more than 150,000 refugees and asylum seekers who over 90% came 
from Myanmar and the rest mainly came from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Somalia (UNHCR, 
2015). Malaysian government confirmed that from 140,000 people of concerns from Myanmar, 
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about 80,000 are ethnic Rohingya (ANA, 2017). In comparison, Indonesia hosts around 14,000 
refugees and asylum seekers who mostly came from Afghanistan (50%), Somalia (11%) and 
Myanmar (7%) (UNHCR, 2016). In 2015, there were 319 Rohingya refugees in Indonesia, but 
the number decreased to 75 people in 2016 as some of them moved illegally to Malaysia 
(Bonasir, 2016). From the data, we could see that the majority of the Refugees in both countries 
are Muslim Refugees, like the Rohingyas in Malaysia and Afghans in Indonesia (Lewa, 2009; 
Hewson, 2014). Likewise, Indonesia and Malaysia are countries with Muslim majorities. Over 
87% or 226 million people in Indonesia are Muslims (CIA, n.d.). Comparatively, There are 19 
million Muslims in Malaysia or about 61% of its total population (CIA, n.d.).  
Judging from those numbers, this paper expects both Indonesia and Malaysia to be more 
lenient toward the refugees. In fact, it is only Malaysia who allows the refugees to work 
temporarily in the country, thus the hypothesis is not satisfied. The question is, why Indonesia, 
despite being a Muslim country, does not provide temporary work permit for the refugees?  
One possible explanation is that the composition of refugees in Indonesia does not 
support the segregation of treatments. Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia are predominantly 
Sunni Muslim, and while the majority of refugees in Malaysia are the Rohingya who mostly 
Sunni, the majority of refugees in Indonesia are ethnic Hazara from Afghanistan who mostly 
Shia Muslim (Lewa, 2009; Hewson, 2014). Sunni and Shia are two major sects in Islam, which 
in some countries like Iran and Syria often have conflicts with each other (BBC, 2016). Albeit 
the relationship between Afghan refugees and local population in Indonesia is mainly peaceful, 
there are signs of rejection from several elements of the community, for example, the National 
Anti-Shia Alliance (ANNAS) in Balikpapan (Pitonak, 2018). Since there are only 75 Rohingya 
refugees in Indonesia in 2016, it is not feasible for the government to segregate their treatments 
from other refugees. If the government also allows the Afghan Refugees to work in the country, 
there might be a rejection from the Anti-Shia groups. Malaysia, in contrast, has a justification 
to segregate their treatments to Rohingya refugees as they are the majorities in the country. 
H5: In cases of strong cultural solidarity between the local population and the refugees, this 
paper expects more permissive policies on refugee's employment. 
In the wake of Rohingya refugee crisis, Indonesian people have led several rallies in 
Jakarta between 2015 and 2017 to condemn the persecution of Rohingya minorities (Arshad, 
2016; BBC, 2017). The Indonesian government was also the first to send humanitarian aid to 
ethnic Rohingya in Myanmar (Tempo, 2017). Likewise, Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib 
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Razak led a rally to oppose the oppression of Rohingya minorities in December 2016 (Ng, 
2016). During the rally, Najib stated that oppression of ethnic Rohingya is “an insult on Islam” 
and called upon other ASEAN countries to act (Ng, 2016). The Malaysian government also 
send a humanitarian mission to help Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (The Sun, 2017). 
We could see that both Indonesia and Malaysia have cultural solidarity with Rohingya 
refugees. Thus, this paper expects that both countries will issue a permissive policy on 
Rohingyas’ employment. However, only Malaysia’s case that seems to fit the hypothesis. 
While Indonesia did establish a national framework to handle refugees in the wake of Rohingya 
refugee crisis,  it does not allow the Refugees to work in the country. Therefore, the hypothesis 
is not satisfied. I argue that the reason why Indonesia does not provide temporary work permit 
for Rohingya refugees despite its signs of solidarity toward them is similar to our previous 
discussion on cultural affinity. Indonesia could not segregate its treatment toward Rohingya 
refugees as their composition is too small compared with other refugees. 
We could also examine the causal mechanism through the perspective of domestic 
politics. Several media have stated that Malaysia's solidarity toward Rohingya refugees is a 
political ploy by Malaysian former PM, Najib Razak to attract Muslim voters in 2018's national 
election as he previously made negative publications in Malaysia, which ruined his chance to 
win the election  (Sim, 2015; Jha, 2017). This is based on the fact that Malaysian government 
often shows generosity to fellow Muslims when it is near to elections (Sukumaran, 2017). For 
examples, Malaysian government offered protection to Bosnian Refugees in 1994, a year 
before their ninth national elections, as well as launched the ‘Gaza emergency fund’ in 2012 
before the 13th national elections (Sukumaran, 2017). This indicates that the government could 
use public solidarity toward refugees to maximize their votes. However, this is not feasible in 
Indonesia because the composition of Rohingya refugees is too small compared with other 
refugees and if the government allows all refugees to work in the country, it will provoke a 
negative response from the local population.  
3. Perception of Security 
Employing refugees may prevent security problems like human trafficking, social 
unrest and terrorism as it allows better management of the group through biometric data 
collection, help the refugees to become more self-sufficient and support their mental health 
(Towle, 2016; Ying, 2017). In this case, I argue that security threats could be a catalyst of 
12 
 
permissive policies on refugee's employment. We will now look at Indonesia and Malaysia's 
security perceptions of refugees and its correlation with their immigration policies. 
H6: In cases of negative security perceptions toward refugees by the host country, this paper 
expects more permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
 We could find the three security concerns associated with refugees, namely terrorism, 
social unrest and human trafficking in Indonesia and Malaysia. In September 2017, Malaysia's 
Deputy Home Minister announced that they will tighten the screenings of Rohingya refugees 
in the wake of emerging militant group in Rakhine state (Kuronumo, 2017). Malaysian Prime 
Minister also alarmed neighboring countries that the displaced and desperate Rohingya 
refugees could become the ground for radicalization by extremist groups (Strait Times, 2018). 
Furthermore, social unrest in Malaysia involving the Muslim and Buddhist community, as well 
as numbers of human trafficking cases have been linked with the influx of Rohingya refugees 
(Reuters, 2013; Fernandes, 2017).  
Indonesia also deals with similar security concerns on refugees. In reaction to ISIS siege 
in Marawi, Philippine, Indonesian Government said that they will be more careful in accepting 
refugees in the country as the refugees often fall to radicalization attempt by terrorist groups, 
such as ISIS (Pratama, 2017). Indonesian Defense Minister, Ryamizard Ryacudu also warned 
his Southeast Asian counterparts to anticipate the possibility of Rohingya refugees joining ISIS 
if they are not well-managed (Putri, 2017). Before the conflict between Buddhist and Muslim 
community happened in Malaysia, Indonesia also had a similar incident involving the refugees 
where Buddhist and Muslim refugees from Myanmar clashed at a refugee camp in Medan, 
resulting in eight deaths (Reuters, 2013). 
 As can be seen, both Indonesia and Malaysia to some extent consider the refugees as a 
threat to their national security. Hence, this paper expects both countries to issue permissive 
policies on refugee’s employment in order to thoroughly manage the group. Nevertheless, 
Indonesian government does not issue legal work permits for the refugees, so the hypothesis is 
not satisfied. Then, why Malaysia allows the refugees to work legally and Indonesia does not 
despite both countries acknowledging them as a potential threat to national security? 
 One possible explanation is the difference in the urgency of the security problem. First, 
Malaysia has a lot more refugees than Indonesia. As mentioned previously, there are 150,000 
refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia compared to 31 million local population (CIA, n.d.). 
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In contrast, there are 14,000 refugees and asylum seekers in Indonesia compared to 260 million 
local population (CIA, n.d.). Secondly, refugees in Malaysia often engaged in illegal works 
which make them prone to detention, human trafficking and labor exploitation (Hoffstaedter, 
2016). The local population in Malaysia also frequently complain about the refugees working 
illegally, for example, Rohingya refugees who open street vendors without a legal license 
(Hayin, 2016). In contrast, refugees in Indonesia rarely engaged in illegal works and instead 
rely on humanitarian aid (Lamb & Doherty, 2018). The local population also rarely complain 
about the refugees. So, I argue that although both countries to some extent have negative 
perceptions toward the refugees, they are more urgent to Malaysia than to Indonesia.  
4. External Relations 
 Some scholars argue that host countries’ immigration policies are influenced by its 
external relations with sending countries, international organizations and migrant’s destination 
countries (Freeman, 1994; Jacobsen, 1996; Cassarino & Fargues, 2006; Sales, 2007). I argue 
that the notion of the destination country is more suitable for regular migration as the refugees 
hardly have the privilege to choose their destination countries. This paper will now examine 
Indonesia and Malaysia’s external relations with the sending countries, as well as international 
organizations especially the international refugee regime. 
H7: In cases of unfriendly relations between host countries and the sending countries, this 
paper expects more permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
 Jacobsen (1996) noted that host country might opt for policies that pressure/embarrass 
an unfriendly sending country or support a friendly sending country. This is because granting 
asylum seeker a refugee status is equal to acknowledging the persecution made by the sending 
country (Jacobsen, 1996). Even though in both our cases the approval of refugee status is the 
mandate of UNHCR and not the governments, I argue that in a similar manner, addressing 
work rights of the refugees might also embarrass the sending country. Unfortunately, it is hard 
to focus on one sending country as the compositions of the refugees’ origin countries are 
different in Indonesia and Malaysia. Since their current immigration policies are triggered by 
Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, I will now analyze Indonesia and Malaysia’s relationship with 
Myanmar and its effect on their immigration policies. 
 Generally, both Indonesia and Malaysia enjoy peaceful and friendly relations with 
Myanmar which mainly prompted by the ASEAN’s non-interference policy. However, 
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Malaysia has experienced a strained in its relationship with Myanmar following the protest 
from Malaysian Prime Minister in December 2016 (The Guardian, 2016). In that occasion, 
Najib referred to the crisis in Rakhine state as the act of “genocide” against Rohingya minorities 
(The Guardian, 2016). Malaysian government further summoned Myanmar’s Ambassador and 
canceled bilateral events with Myanmar (The Guardian, 2016). As a result, Myanmar’s 
government stop sending their workers to Malaysia for at least 6 months (Htwe, 2017). This 
became a problem to Malaysia as Myanmar is one of its sources of cheap labors and usually 
send 3,000 workers to the country every month (Htwe, 2017). Myanmar’s nationalist group 
also held a rally to condemn the action of Malaysian PM, saying that he is siding with terrorists 
(Mon & Naing, 2016). 
 Indonesia, on the other hand, had never experienced a strained relation with Myanmar. 
In fact, Indonesia has been engaged in a positive communication with Myanmar regarding the 
Rohingya issues. In 2013, former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa visited the 
Rakhine state in Myanmar, which made him the highest-ranking international visitor in the 
conflict area since the crisis outbreak (Markar, 2013). The relationship continues when the 
current Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi made an official visit to Myanmar and talked with 
Myanmar’s First State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi over the Rohingya issues (Strait Times, 
2017). During that time, Indonesia was the only country that has access to Rakhine State and 
could deliver humanitarian aid (Tempo, 2017). 
As has been noted, around 2016 Malaysia had a strained relationship with Myanmar, 
while on the other hand, Indonesia maintains its relationship with the country. From this data, 
this paper expects that around 2016, Malaysia will have more permissive policies on refugee’s 
employment than Indonesia. The hypothesis is satisfied as Malaysia allow Rohingya refugees 
to work in the country and Indonesia does not. However, further research shows that the 
possibility of Malaysia giving work permit to Rohingya refugees as an attempt to embarrass 
Myanmar for its action might be a spurious correlation. This argument is based on the fact that 
two days after Najib’s protest, Malaysian government send its army chief to meet with 
Myanmar’s president to mend their relationship (Mon, 2016). The possible causal mechanism 
is that their strained relationship influenced Malaysia’s immigration policies indirectly as 
Myanmar decided to stop sending workers to Malaysia for months (Htwe, 2017). As we know, 
Malaysia relies on foreign labors and Myanmar is one of its sources for cheap labors. Therefore, 
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Malaysian government tries to find an alternative solution to the shortage of manpower by 
hiring refugees. 
H8: In cases of strong involvement of the international refugee regime in host countries, this 
paper expects more permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
 International refugee regime like UNHCR limits the flexibility of host country’s 
immigration policies through the enforcement of international norms, international assistance 
and international publicity (Freeman, 1994; Jacobsen, 1996). Thus, strong involvement of 
international refugee regime in host countries may prompt pro-immigration policies. This paper 
will now examine the involvement of international organizations especially the international 
refugee regime in Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as its correlation with their policies on 
refugee’s employment. 
 The international refugee regime is led by UNHCR (Freeman G. P., 1994). UNHCR is 
an integral part of Indonesia and Malaysia’s refugee policy. UNHCR has been working in 
Malaysia since 1975 and in Indonesia since 1979 (UNHCR, n.d.). Since both countries are not 
parties of the 1951 Refugee Convention, UNHCR has been given the mandate to determines 
refugee status in Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as facilitate temporary and durable solutions 
for the refugees (UNHCR, n.d.). The pilot project to allow Rohingya refugees to work is a 
collaborative effort between Malaysian Government and UNHCR (Yi, 2016). Moreover, 
Indonesia’s new Presidential Decree on refugees also clearly described the role of UNHCR in 
handling refugees and asylum seekers (Hukum Online, n.d.). 
 Another prominent institution in Indonesia and Malaysia is the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), who has been operating in both countries since the 1970s 
(IOM, n.d.). IOM provide technical and financial support for refugees and migrants in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia currently holds an observer status in IOM, the total value 
of IOM's project in the country reached USD 66 Million in 2013 (IOM, n.d.). Malaysia is not 
yet an IOM member or observer, but in 2016 Malaysia proposed to become a member state to 
enhance cooperation with IOM, particularly in managing Syrian refugees (The Sun, 2016). 
Both Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as UNHCR and IOM are the core members of the Bali 
Process, a regional consultative process on people smuggling and human trafficking issues that 
currently have 48-member states and international organizations (Bali Process, n.d.). In the 
past few years, Bali process has been promoting refugee’s employment in the region. For 
example, In September 2016, Bali Process held an event called the ‘Pathways to Employment: 
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Expanding legal and legitimate labor market opportunities for refugees’ in Bangkok, Thailand 
(Bali Process, 2016). 
 Following the theory by Jacobsen (1996), international refugee regime could affect a 
country’s refugee policy practically through international assistance, and normatively through 
international publicity. UNHCR and IOM have been assisting Indonesia and Malaysia on 
refugee issues for decades. In 2016, UNHCR expended USD 4 Million aid for Indonesia and 
USD 8 Million for Malaysia (UNHCR, 2018). They also allocated USD 7 Million more budget 
for Indonesia and USD 19 Million budget for Malaysia in 2017 (UNHCR, 2018). UNHCR and 
IOM also responsible for facilitating refugee resettlement from Indonesia and Malaysia, which 
could become a leverage for lobbying the government. Secondly, the international refugee 
regime could affect Indonesia and Malaysia's refugee policy through international publication. 
As we know that Rohingya issue has become international concern. An international 
organization like UNHCR has the ability to create public opinion through its publications. For 
example, UNHCR has praised Malaysia's action to give the Rohingya refugees work permit 
(Relief Web, 2017). Jacobsen (1996) further stated that the leverage of international refugee 
regime on host country could be negated by the sensitivity of the issue and the country's 
national interest. We have found that the unemployment and poverty rates, as well as the 
opinion of the local population in Indonesia, are very sensitive to refugee employment. This 
might explain why Indonesia choose to establish a different policy to help Rohingya refugees, 
without giving them work permits. 
 From the discussion, we find that there are strong involvements of the international 
refugee regime in Indonesia and Malaysia. Accordingly, this paper expects that both countries 
will have permissive policies on refugees’ employment. Nevertheless, only Malaysia’s case 
that seems to fit the hypothesis, so it is not satisfied. However, the question is why Indonesia 
does not provide temporary work permit for the refugees despite the strong involvement of 
international refugee regime in the country? 
 Jacobsen (1996) stated that the leverage of international refugee regime on host country 
could be negated by the sensitivity of the issue and the country's national interest. We have 
found that the unemployment and poverty rates, as well as the opinion of the local population 
in Indonesia, are very sensitive to refugee employment. This might explain why Indonesia 
choose to establish a different policy to help Rohingya refugees, without giving them work 
permits. 
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Table 1: Summary of the Hypotheses 
No Hypothesis Indonesia Malaysia 
1 In cases of stable GDP and GDP per capita’s growth 
in receiving countries, this paper expects more 
permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
Not Satisfied Satisfied 
2 In cases of low employment and poverty rates in 
receiving countries, this paper expects more 
permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
Satisfied Satisfied 
3 In cases of a favorable composition of skilled and 
unskilled refugees relative to native workers, this 
paper expects more permissive policies on refugee's 
employment. 
Satisfied Satisfied 
4 In cases of strong cultural affinity between the local 
population and the refugees, this paper expects more 
permissive policies on refugee's employment. 
Not Satisfied Satisfied 
5 In cases of strong cultural solidarity between the local 
population and the refugees, this paper expects more 
permissive policies on refugee's employment. 
Not Satisfied Satisfied 
6 In cases of negative security perceptions toward 
refugees by the host country, this paper expects more 
permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
Not Satisfied Satisfied 
7 In cases of unfriendly relations between host countries 
and the sending countries, this paper expects more 
permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
Satisfied Satisfied 
8 In cases of strong involvement of the international 
refugee regime in host countries, this paper expects 
more permissive policies on refugee’s employment. 
Not Satisfied Satisfied 
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V. Conclusion 
 This paper explored the phenomena of refugee employment in transit countries from 
the perspective of immigration policymaking. Indonesia and Malaysia were chosen as the case 
studies in the wake of their new refugee policy in 2016. Malaysia launched a pilot project that 
allows 300 Rohingya refugees to temporarily work in plantation and manufacturing sectors. In 
contrast, Indonesia issued a Presidential Decree that provides the national legal framework for 
refugees' treatment but does not address their work rights. The research question is, why 
Indonesia and Malaysia made contrasting policies on refugee’s employment in 2016 regardless 
of their common characteristics as transit points for refugees? 
 This paper found that economic conditions, cultural affinity, security perceptions and 
external relations play important roles in both countries immigration policy-making. However, 
the strongest determinants of their contrasting policies on refugee's employment in 2016 are 
employment and poverty rates, the composition of skilled and unskilled migrants relative to 
native workers, as well as external relation with the sending countries. First of all, Malaysia 
has a lower unemployment and poverty rates than Indonesia. Secondly, Malaysia has a shortage 
of unskilled workers while Indonesia has a surplus. Thirdly, Malaysia's strained relationship 
with Myanmar exacerbates its shortage of manpower while Indonesia maintains friendly 
relations with Myanmar. Therefore, when the Rohingya crisis emerged in 2015, Malaysian 
Government could utilize the momentum to gain domestic and international recognition by 
providing work permits for refugees. On the other hand, Indonesia had to choose a less-
sensitive policy by establishing a Presidential Decree.  
 In conclusion, it is possible to promote temporary work rights for refugees in transit 
countries as long as the country has a receptive labor market. Therefore, the key solution is to 
find a particular sector with a gap in labor supply and demand where the refugees could fill. 
Furthermore, during the study, the author found that it is difficult to focus on a single dyad 
when researching about the refugees as the composition of the refugees is different in Indonesia 
and Malaysia. The study also could only focus on a short time period due to time and words 
limitation. Thus, a further study with complete analysis on the dyads and a longer time frame 
is recommended. 
  
19 
 
References 
Ador, N. J. (2017, January 6). The Real Score on the Number of Foreigners Working in 
Indonesia. Retrieved from Indonesia Expat: http://indonesiaexpat.biz/featured/real-
score-number-foreigners-working-indonesia/ 
Allen, E. R. (2016, March). Analysis of trends and challenges in the Indonesian labor market. 
ADB Papers on Indonesia, 16. 
ANA. (2017, July 29). Malaysian Minister: Malaysia is implementing a resolution allowing 
Rohingya to work. Retrieved from Arakan News Agency Web Site: 
http://arakanna.com/wp_arakanna/en/?p=9299 
Arendt, H. (1973). The Origins of Totalitarianism. London: Harcourt Brace & Company. 
Arshad, A. (2016, November 25). Demonstrators rally outside Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta 
to protest Rohingya crackdown. Retrieved from The Strait Times: 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/demonstrators-rally-outside-myanmar-
embassy-in-jakarta-to-protest-against-rohingya 
Bali Process. (2016, September 15). Summary: Pathways to Employment. Retrieved from 
Bali Process Web Site: https://www.baliprocess.net/news/summary-pathways-to-
employment-expanding-legal-and-legitimate-labour-market-opportunities-for-
refugees/ 
Bali Process. (n.d.). About the Bali Process. Retrieved from Bali Process Web Site: 
https://www.baliprocess.net/ 
BBC. (2016, January 4). Sunnis and Shia: Islam's ancient schism. Retrieved from BBC 
News: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16047709 
BBC. (2017, September 3). 'Rohingya adalah kita': solidaritas agama atau kemanusiaan? 
Retrieved from BBC Indonesia Web Site: http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-
41141169 
BBC. (2018, May 10). Malaysia election: Opposition scores historic victory. Retrieved from 
BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44036178 
Bernie, M. (2018, May 4). Indonesia Kekurangan 58 Juta Tenaga Kerja Terlatih 
Bersertifikat. Retrieved from Tirto Web Site: https://tirto.id/indonesia-kekurangan-58-
juta-tenaga-kerja-terlatih-bersertifikat-cJTM 
Bonasir, R. (2016, February 28). Pengungsi Rohingya di Aceh 'mungkin akan habis' sebelum 
setahun. Retrieved from BBC Indonesia: 
http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/02/160227_indonesia_pengung
si_rohingya_tenggat 
Cassarino, J.-P., & Fargues, P. (2006). Policy Responses in MENA Countries of Transit for 
Migrants: An Analytical Framework for Policy-Making. Mediterranean Transit 
Migration, 101-108. 
20 
 
CIA. (n.d.). The World Factbook. Retrieved from Central Intelligence Agency: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html 
Facchini, G., & Mayda, A. M. (2008, October). From Individual Attitudes Towards Migrants 
to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence. Economic Policy, 23(56), pp. 
651-713. 
Fernandes, D. F. (2017, September 1). The Plight of Rohingyas in Malaysia. Retrieved from 
The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/the-plight-of-rohingyas-in-malaysia/ 
Fox News. (2015, May 25). Rohingya refugees see Malaysia as land of hope but face tenuous 
existence on margins. Retrieved from Fox News: 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/05/25/rohingya-refugees-see-malaysia-as-land-
hope-but-face-tenuous-existence-on.html 
Freeman, G. P. (1994, July). Can Liberal States Control Unwanted Migration. The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 534, pp. 17-30. 
Freeman, G. P. (1995). Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States. The 
International Migration Review, 29(4), pp. 881-902. 
Goertz, G., & Mahoney, J. (2012). A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Research in the Social Sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Haas, H., & Natter, K. (2015). The determinants of migration policies: Does the political 
orientation of governments matter? International Migration Institute Working Paper 
Series(117). 
Hamdani, T. (2016, December 26). Kata Mereka: Indonesia Diserbu Tenaga Kerja Asing, 
Bagaimana Tanggapan Masyarakat? Retrieved from Okezone Finance: 
https://economy.okezone.com/read/2016/12/25/320/1575432/kata-mereka-indonesia-
diserbu-tenaga-kerja-asing-bagaimana-tanggapan-masyarakat 
Hatton, T. J. (2004). Seeking Asylum in Europe. Economic Policy, 19(38), pp. 5-62. 
Hayin, N. M. (2016, October 25). Takluk tanah kerajaan. Retrieved from My Metro: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161206065924/http://www.hmetro.com.my/node/1766
18 
Hewson, J. (2014, March 21). Afghan Hazara's new life in Indonesia. Retrieved from 
Aljazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/afghan-hazaras-new-
life-indonesia-201436121639956520.html 
Hoffstaedter, G. (2016, November 28). Is working legally a win-win for refugees in 
Malaysia? Retrieved from APPS Policy Forum: 
https://www.policyforum.net/working-legally-win-win-refugees-malaysia/ 
Htwe, Z. Z. (2017, May 5). No go yet to Malaysia for Myanmar workers. Retrieved from 
Myanmar Times: https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/25860-no-go-yet-to-
malaysia-for-myanmar-workers.html 
21 
 
Hugo, G., Tan, G., & Napitupulu, C. J. (2014, May/June). Indonesia as a transit country in 
irregular migration to Australia. Australian Population and Migration Research 
Centre Policy Brief, 2(2). 
Hukum Online. (n.d.). Peraturan Presiden No. 125 Tahun 2016. Retrieved from Hukum 
Online: 
http://www.hukumonline.com/pusatdata/download/lt587df4ff16dbd/node/lt587df4a4c
26c5 
Indonesia Investments. (2016, June 29). Number of Foreign Workers in Indonesia on the 
Decline. Retrieved from Indonesia Investments Web Site: https://www.indonesia-
investments.com/id/news/todays-headlines/number-of-foreign-workers-in-indonesia-
on-the-decline/item6964? 
IOM. (n.d.). About IOM. Retrieved from International Organization for Migration: 
https://www.iom.int/about-iom 
Jacobsen, K. (1996). Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass 
Refugee Influxes. The International Migration Review, 30(3), pp. 655-678. 
Jamil, H. J., Fakhoury, M., Yamin, J. B., Arnetz, J. E., & Arnetz, B. B. (2016). Determinants 
of Employment among Well-Educated Refugees Before and After the 2007 U.S. 
Economic Recession. Left Health Biol Sci. 
Jha, P. (2017, January 13). Can Rohingya Refugee Finally Leave the Shadows? Retrieved 
from Foreign Policy Web Site: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/13/rohingya-
refugees-can-finally-leave-the-shadows/ 
Joppke, C. (2005). Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Kanapathy, V. (2006). Migrant Workers in Malaysia: An overview. Retrieved from Centre for 
Policy Initiatives: 
http://www.cpiasia.net/v3/images/policy_papers/Migrant%20Workers%20in%20Mala
ysia_An%20Overview.pdf 
Kuronumo, Y. (2017, October 30). Rohingya crisis raises risks of terrorism and social 
unrest. Retrieved from Nikkei Asian Review: 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Rohingya-crisis-raises-risks-of-terrorism-and-social-
unrest2 
Lamb, K., & Doherty, B. (2018, April 15). On the streets with desperate refugees who dream 
of being detained. Retrieved from The Guardian: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/15/on-the-streets-with-the-desperate-
refugees-who-dream-of-being-detained 
Lewa, C. (2009). North Arakan: an open prison for the Rohingya in Burma. Forced 
Migration Review. 
Malaysian Digest. (2015, February 10). Migrant Workers: Malaysia's 'Invisible' Workforce. 
Retrieved from Malaysian Digest Web Site: 
22 
 
http://www.malaysiandigest.com/features/541277-migrant-workers-malaysia-s-
invisible-workforce.html 
Markar, M. M. (2013, April 9). Indonesia's special relationship with Burma faces testing 
times. Retrieved from The Irrawaddy: 
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/asia/indonesias-special-relationship-with-burma-
faces-testing-times.html 
Minter, A. (2016, April 27). Plenty of jobs, but no one take them. Retrieved from New Strait 
Times: https://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/04/141853/plenty-jobs-no-one-take-them 
Mon, Y. (2016, December 6). President, military chiefs meet to smooth Myanmar-Malaysia 
ties. Retrieved from Myanmar Times: https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/nay-
pyi-taw/24063-president-military-chiefs-meet-to-smooth-myanmar-malaysia-ties.html 
Mon, Y., & Naing, S. (2016, December 5). Duelling protests as tensions rise between 
Myanmar and Malaysia. Retrieved from Myanmar Times: 
https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/24035-duelling-protests-as-tensions-
rise.html 
Ng, E. (2016, December 4). Malaysia's prime minister leads protest against 'genocide' 
against Muslims in Rohingya. Retrieved from The Independent UK: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/genocide-of-rohingya-burma-aung-san-
suu-kyi-malaysian-pm-najib-razak-leads-protest-against-a7454656.html 
Pitonak, A. (2018, April 3). Pressure to return? Afghan refugees protest at Indonesian 
detention centre. Retrieved from Relief Web: 
https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/pressure-return-afghan-refugees-protest-
indonesian-detention-centre 
Povera, A. (2018, January 9). Malaysia needs foreign workers to meet shortage of manpower. 
Retrieved from New Strait Times: 
https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2018/01/323365/malaysia-needs-foreign-
workers-meet-shortage-manpower 
Pratama, A. B. (2017, April 10). Waspada Teroris, Indonesia Hati-Hati Terima Pengungsi. 
Retrieved from CNN Indonesia: 
https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20170410150359-106-206336/waspada-
teroris-indonesia-hati-hati-terima-pengungsi 
Putri, P. K. (2017, October 13). Menhan akan bawa masalah Rohingya ke pertemuan 
trilateral Filipina. Retrieved from Detik News: https://news.detik.com/berita/d-
3682776/menhan-akan-bawa-masalah-rohingya-ke-pertemuan-trilateral-filipina 
Relief Web. (2017, February 3). UNHCR lauds government work scheme for refugees. 
Retrieved from Relief Web: https://reliefweb.int/report/malaysia/unhcr-lauds-
government-work-scheme-refugees 
Reuters. (2013, June 5). Four dead as Myanmar violence spills into Malaysia: police. 
Retrieved from Reuters Web Site: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-
23 
 
myanmar-violence/four-dead-as-myanmar-violence-spills-into-malaysia-police-
idUSBRE9540BA20130605 
Rosenblum, M. R., & Cornelius, W. A. (2012). Dimensions of Immigration Policy. Retrieved 
from Oxford Handbooks Online: 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/10.1093/oxfordh
b/9780195337228.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195337228-e-11 
Sales, R. (2007). Understanding Immigration and Refugee Policy. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Sim, J. (2015, Mei 22). 4 reasons why taking in the Rohingya refugee is good for M'sia. 
Retrieved from Cilisos: https://cilisos.my/5-reasons-why-taking-in-the-rohingya-
refugees-is-good-for-msia/ 
Strait Times. (2017, September 5). Indonesia should broker peace in Myanmar: the Jakarta 
Post. Retrieved from The Strait Times: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-
asia/indonesia-should-broker-peace-in-myanmar-the-jakarta-post 
Strait Times. (2018, March 17). Malaysia warns Rohingya crisis could pose security risk . 
Retrieved from The Strait Times: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-
warns-rohingya-crisis-could-pose-security-risk 
Sukumaran, T. (2017, April 30). Is Malaysian Support for Rohingya an Election Ploy by 
Najib Razak? Retrieved from South China Morning Post: 
http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2091627/malaysian-support-
rohingya-election-ploy-najib-razak 
Tempo. (2017, September 8). Krisis Rohingya, Hanya Indonesia yang Bisa Masuk ke 
Myanmar. Retrieved from Tempo News: 
https://nasional.tempo.co/read/907313/krisis-rohingya-hanya-indonesia-yang-bisa-
masuk-ke-myanmar 
The Guardian. (2016, December 4). Malaysia PM urges world to act against 'genocide' of 
Myanmar's Rohingya. Retrieved from The Guardian Web Site: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/04/malaysia-pm-urges-world-to-act-
against-genocide-of-myanmars-rohingya 
The Sun. (2016, October 31). Malaysia wants to be member of IOM: DPM. Retrieved from 
The Sun Daily: http://www.thesundaily.my/news/2044464 
The Sun. (2017, September 8). Malaysia to send humanitarian mission to help Rohingya 
refugees. Retrieved from The Sun Daily: 
http://www.thesundaily.my/news/2017/09/08/malaysia-send-humanitarian-mission-
help-rohingya-refugees 
Totten, R. (2008). National Security and U.S. Immigration Policy, 1776-1790. The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, 39(1), pp. 37-64. 
Towle, R. (2016, June 20). Employing Refugees A Win-Win Solution. Retrieved from 
UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/6/5912881c7/employing-refugees-a-
win-win-solution.html 
24 
 
UNHCR. (2015, August). Malaysia Factsheet. Retrieved from UNHCR Web Site: 
http://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/56167f6b6/malaysia-fact-sheet.html 
UNHCR. (2015). State Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the 1967 Protocol. Retrieved from UNHCR Web Site: 
http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/states-parties-1951-convention-its-
1967-protocol.html 
UNHCR. (2016, December). Indonesia Factsheet. Retrieved from UNHCR Web Site: 
http://www.unhcr.org/id/wp-content/uploads/sites/42/2017/05/Indonesia-Fact-Sheet-
December-2016.pdf 
UNHCR. (2017, June 19). Figures at a Glance. Retrieved from UNHCR Web Site: 
http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html 
UNHCR. (2018). Indonesia. Retrieved from UNHCR Global Focus: 
http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/10335 
UNHCR. (2018). Malaysia. Retrieved from UNHCR Global Focus: 
http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2532 
UNHCR. (n.d.). Solutions. Retrieved from UNHCR Web Site: 
http://www.unhcr.org/solutions.html 
UNHCR. (n.d.). UNHCR in Indonesia. Retrieved from UNHCR Indonesia: 
http://www.unhcr.org/id/en/unhcr-in-indonesia 
UNHCR. (n.d.). UNHCR in Malaysia. Retrieved from UNHCR Malaysia: 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-my/unhcr-in-malaysia.html 
Varagur, K. (2017, January 27). Indonesia Breaks Silence on Refugees with Presidential 
Decree. Retrieved from VOA News: https://www.voanews.com/a/indonesia-breaks-
silence-on-refugees-with-presidential-decree/3696079.html 
Wai, W. C. (2016, October 10). Rising number of foreign workers in Malaysia - a worrying 
statistic: The Star columnist. Retrieved from The Strait Times: 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/should-we-think-about-malaysia-the-star-
columnist 
World Bank. (n.d.). Malaysia. Retrieved from World Bank Web Site: 
https://data.worldbank.org/country/malaysia 
Yi, B. L. (2016, November 24). Malaysia in pilot scheme to allow Rohingya refugees to 
work. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-refugees-
rohingya/malaysia-in-pilot-scheme-to-allow-rohingya-refugees-to-work-
idUSKBN13J1F1 
Ying, C. X. (2017, August). Rohingya Refugees in Malaysia: Need for Policy Rethink. RSIS 
Commentary, 156(29). 
 
